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Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era
Carl Minzner

I

n the fall of 2014, Chinese Communist Party authorities made legal
reform the focus of their annual plenum for the first time. The Fourth
Plenum Decision confirmed a shift away from some of the policies of the late
Hu Jintao era, but liberal reforms still remain off the table. The top-down
vision of legal reform developing under Xi Jinping’s administration
may have more in common with current trends in the party disciplinary
apparatus or historical ones in the imperial Chinese censorate than it does
with Western rule-of-law norms.
This essay attempts to do three things: (1) analyze how and why China’s
legal reforms have shifted over the past two decades, (2) outline the direction
of reform under Xi, and (3) sketch out the institutional considerations that
are likely to steer state efforts in the legal field over the coming years.

The Turn Against Law
In the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese Communist Party
authorities turned against many of the legal reform efforts that they
themselves had launched in the 1980s and 1990s. Starting around 2005,
a new official line began to gradually penetrate China’s judicial and legal
organs. Broadly speaking, this position included the following:
• A shift away from late 20th-century efforts to promote judicial
professionalism, coupled with a revival of 1950s Maoist-era ideals of
judicial populism
• A revived focus on mediation, rather than court trials, as a preferred
mechanism for resolving conflicts among citizens as well as between
citizens and the state
• A new state narrative depicting the law as cold and unresponsive to
citizen needs
• A stress on the courts as an undifferentiated cog within the state
organs for stability maintenance (weiwen)
• A steady reduction in tolerance for the activities of public interest
(weiquan) lawyers
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• A new political campaign reiterating party supremacy over the
constitution, law, and courts
• The charging of local officials with the priority task of containing
citizen disputes, conflicts, and petitions at all costs
Central authorities employed multiple tools to implement these shifts.
Some were highly public—for example, the 2008 appointment of a veteran
security apparatchik as the new head of the Supreme People’s Court, the
2009 police raid on the Open Constitution Initiative, and the subsequent
repression of public interest lawyers such as Xu Zhiyong and Teng Biao.
Other tools were less visible. New propaganda campaigns within the courts
presented changed depictions of “model” judges to emulate: tireless court
officials perhaps lacking in book learning but at ease among the masses,
recognizant of parties’ emotions, and able to resolve disputes (often without
resort to legal norms) before they blossomed into conflict. Personnel
evaluation systems for judges and other officials were tweaked to emphasize
mediation rather than adjudication.
In part, this shift was a politicized counter-reaction to the results of
earlier reforms. Late 20th-century Chinese authorities had emphasized
the role of law, litigation, and court mechanisms for resolving civil and
administrative disputes. By the early 21st century, these practices had given
rise to a range of actors within both state and society pushing for deeper
institutional change. The early 2000s had seen activists such as Xu and Teng
fuse court challenges with savvy use of the media to put heavy pressure on
both central and local authorities. Within the bureaucracy itself, new voices
were beginning to suggest that the law and constitution should be assigned a
greater role in governing official actions. The new official line that descended
on the legal system in the first decade of the 21st century sought to defang
some of these pressures.
Central authorities were also motivated by deep concerns over social
unrest. They saw legal reforms channeling disputes into an institutionally
weak judiciary lacking the capacity to enforce its own verdicts. They noted
with unease a rising tide of citizen petitioners invoking the language of
law and rights—not always with merit—to mount increasingly organized
challenges to the actions of local officials. And they voiced concerns that
a rising cadre of academically trained young judges preferred to sit behind
their desks and write opinions on technical legal issues rather than, for
example, camp out in muddy fields and engage in tough negotiations to
head off imminent mass protests by villagers aggrieved by land seizures
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for development projects. Faced with such concerns, revival of Maoist-era
populist judging techniques, coupled with a political crackdown in the legal
system, made eminent sense to China’s leaders.

Legal Reform, Xi-Style
Now Beijing has changed course yet again. Since 2012, many—but
not all—of the above elements have been abandoned in central policy
statements. This shift is broadly reflected in the 2014 Central Committee
plenum decision. It is also expressed in a range of detailed implementation
measures that party officials have issued in recent months. In part, the new
official line consists of the following elements:
• Assertions of legal and judicial reform as a central priority of Xi’s
administration
• Attempts to centralize control over the judicial system and limit the
influence of local officials
• A return to concepts of judicial professionalism
• Efforts to steer citizen disputes back to the courts
• Revived emphasis on adjudication and trials as the center of court work
• A renewed focus on the distinctions between the roles of judges and
other state employees
Central authorities have relied on a range of mechanisms to push
these changes. Legal technocrats have once again been placed in charge
of China’s courts—most notably with the appointment in 2013 of Zhou
Qiang as China’s top judge, the president of the Supreme People’s Court.
The current model judge campaign within China’s courts now extols a set
of values that differ dramatically from those emphasized five years ago. The
campaign surrounds the recently deceased vice president of the Shanghai
High People’s Court and touts his educational credentials, academic
publications, professional demeanor, trial experience, and expertise at
creating PowerPoint presentations. Authorities are also attempting to alter
judicial personnel systems by instructing courts to clean up “unreasonable”
performance targets used to evaluate judges.
Additionally, Chinese officials are seeking to centralize control over
the judiciary and insulate judges from local influences. In 2013, China
launched experimental reforms in six provinces aimed at removing control
over court personnel and funding from the hands of local governments
[6]
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and vesting it instead with provincial authorities. Further moves have
followed in the wake of the 2014 Fourth Plenum Decision. The creation
of cross-jurisdictional local courts and procuratorates seeks to cut across
existing administrative lines of authority and curb the influence of local
officials. The establishment of circuit tribunals of the Supreme People’s
Court in regional centers (Shenzhen and Shenyang being the first two) aims
to extend the court’s reach and better coordinate the exercise of judicial
power in cross-provincial cases. And building on language in the Decision,
party officials have ordered local government authorities not to interfere
with ongoing court cases, while judges have been instructed to keep records
of any violations. Naturally, this is not aimed at disturbing the underlying
principle of one-party rule. Party political-legal committees remain intact,
and courts are still expected to follow their guidance.
Thus, much remains unchanged. Social stability continues to be a
paramount concern. Party disciplinary authorities, rather than legal organs,
have taken the lead in the massive anticorruption campaign that Xi has
launched to shake up the bureaucracy and topple his rivals. Repressive
policies launched over the past decade have not weakened, and in some cases
they are strengthening. Beijing has, for example, intensified the crackdown
on public-interest lawyers. A new draft law is poised to both curtail the
operations of foreign NGOs in China and severely restrict the funding of
domestic Chinese organizations and legal activists. Academic discourse in
the field of constitutional law has been curtailed, and authorities appear
to be moving toward a broader repoliticization of higher education amid
new calls for China to resist the infiltration of foreign ideas and pay more
attention to its own cultural and historical roots.

Back to the Past?
China’s current trajectory is not simply a replay of the 1990s and early
2000s, when the field of legal reform was a strategic gray zone. Then, centrally
driven top-down reforms (such as moves to increase the educational level
of judges) coexisted with a wide range of experimental reforms by local
officials, as well as with bottom-up pressures from activists seeking to
employ the language of legal reform to advance their own interests.
That space has now contracted for two reasons. First, since the early
2000s, state authorities have become much less tolerant of broader social
activism in the legal arena. Second, the fact that central party authorities
under Xi Jinping have put forward their own comprehensive agenda for
[7]
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legal reform has curtailed the willingness of local authorities to go out on a
limb and experiment. When central mandates regarding the law remained
relatively vague, as with the broad invocation of yifa zhiguo (rule according
to law) in the late 1990s, room existed for local officials and citizen activists to
interpret exactly what that should mean in practice. Now central authorities
have begun to reduce these mandates to a more concrete formulation. There
is consequently less room for maneuver, rendering risk-adverse local officials
more likely to hew narrowly to the specific contours of central plans.
The direction of judicial reform under Xi also differs in key ways from
that of the late Hu Jintao era. Centralization, professionalization, and
separation from local interests are the new watchwords of the day. Nor
is this limited to the legal system. Similar trends are taking place in the
party’s internal disciplinary inspection apparatus. Numbers of personnel
are expanding, and nomination and selection criteria for disciplinary
inspection heads have been altered to strengthen central control and
weaken dependence on local party authorities. In addition, central
disciplinary authorities are in the process of establishing physical offices in
all central party and government bureaus. This latter measure is part of a
comprehensive push under Xi to strengthen the disciplinary apparatus—led
by his ally Wang Qishan—as a tool to purge the party bureaucracy of graft,
as well as curb the power of Xi’s rivals.
Both the judicial and disciplinary reforms are efforts to develop
vertically integrated systems to circumvent the power of local officials,
check the bureaucracy, and address the core principal-agent problem at the
heart of Chinese governance. None of this is new. Historically, the imperial
Chinese censorate—officials charged with serving as the eyes and ears of
the emperor—played precisely this role. Its primary goal was not to provide
justice in individual cases but to help central leaders ferret out misbehavior
among the ranks of officialdom. Perhaps something paralleling this kind
of top-down model of governance—one absent the problematic bottom-up
pressures unleashed by late twentieth-century reforms—might resemble the
new direction for legal reform in China.
This is not to say that central judicial officials are intentionally
attempting to replicate imperial models. To the contrary, recent personnel
appointments at the Supreme People’s Court have left no doubt that
liberal-leaning legal technocrats have been given significant sway in
that institution. Rather, the point is simply that in a broader political
environment where party officials remain hostile to concepts such as an
autonomous bar, independent judiciary, and external checks on party
[8]
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power, the components of rule-of-law reforms that are most likely to be
enacted successfully are the ones that most closely resemble existing party
practices. Naturally, these measures themselves will in turn have parallels
with earlier historical models.
The new track of Chinese legal reform leaves open many sets of
questions. First, will courts be allowed to check other, more powerful
institutions such as the police? Allowing courts to rearrange their own
internal bureaucratic structures is one thing. But raising the bureaucratic
status of judges within the party political-legal apparatus so that they can
play a meaningful role in helping central officials realize the goal of curbing
police abuses that lead to wrongful convictions is quite another matter.
The latter implicates much deeper issues of political organization that have
stymied reform efforts for the past two decades.
Second, how will these new efforts at legal reform interact with the
omnipresent pressures for social stability? What happens, for example,
when a Chinese judge, insulated from local political realities, issues a
legally correct decision denying hundreds of laid-off workers the right to
receive back wages, resulting in an angry demonstration in front of the local
government headquarters? Will the local party secretary be authorized to
simply ignore the decision? If so, how will protestors react?
Third, what will the reaction of judges be? Xi’s austerity campaign has
reduced many of the perks associated with civil service in China, while
the anticorruption campaign has increased the risks. This shift has led to a
spreading sense of paralysis within the bureaucracy, as officials are simply
avoiding tough decisions. Within the courts, new moves to professionalize the
system by reducing the number of individuals holding the title of judge have
aroused discontent and contributed to a steady exodus of personnel. Can the
court system effectively be remodeled without losing institutional cohesion?
At the 2014 plenum, party leaders clearly signaled their intent to
rely on the law as a tool to help resolve the pressing problems currently
facing China. But over the past two decades, Beijing’s insistence on
holding legal institutions apart from the institutional issues that matter
has limited their ability to evolve into significant players within the state
bureaucracy. And regular shifts in the direction of reform have prevented
these institutions from sinking deep roots into society at large. As a result,
it is unclear whether Xi’s strategy will work. 
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